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I Introduction 
For the novelist A.P. Herbert in 1967 the problem with the Thames was simple. 'London 
5LYHUKDVVRPDQ\PRWKHUVLWGRHVQ¶WNQRZwhat to do. ... What is needed is one wise, far-
VHHLQJJUDQGPRWKHU¶1 Herbert had been campaigning for a barrage across the river to keep 
the tide out of the city, with little success. There were other, powerful claims on the river 
and numerous responsible agencies. And the Thames was QRWMXVWµ/RQGRQ5LYHU¶: it runs 
for over 300 miles from Gloucestershire to the North Sea. The capital¶VLQWHUGHSHQGHQW
relationship with the Thames estuary highlights an important problem of governance. 
Rivers are complex, multi-functional entities that cut across land-based boundaries and 
create interdependencies between distant places. How do you govern a city that is 
connected by its river to other communities up and downstream? Who should decide what 
the river is for and how it should be managed?  
The River Thames provides a case study for exploring the challenges of governing a river 
in a context of changing political cultures. Many different stories could be told about the 
river, as a water source, drain, port, inland waterway, recreational amenity, riverside space, 
fishery, wildlife habitat or eco-system. Rivers are constituted as resources variably over 
time, with changing 'competencies and capacities'.2 This article takes as its starting point 
the two functions that dominated the tideway at the start of this period: as the nation's 
major trading port, and the quickest and cheapest way of removing sewage. It explores the 
ways in which flows of urban waste on the river have created political conflicts within the 
capital and connected London to the estuary downstream as an 'ecological hinterland'.3 The 
river has long provided vital environmental services for London, especially as its water 
supply and dumping ground. It also provided the means for the capital to reach beyond its 
boundaries. In contrast to the mid-Victorian river, with its polluted water sources and 
unregulated sewage discharges in the heart of the city, these had shifted outwards by the 
late nineteenth century, with water supply abstractions confined to the freshwater river 
above London and new sewage outfalls below the city.4  
Though the image of London as a Leviathan swallowing up neighbouring areas has a long 
pedigree,5 histories of London's river have been comparatively self-contained. The Thames 
itself has been studied especially in relation to nineteenth-century urban utilities and public 
health. Metropolitan water supply, sewerage and pollution have been shown to be integral 
to the 'London Government ProbOHP
+RZVKRXOG/RQGRQ¶VSRSXODWLRQEHSURYLGHGIRU
and governed? How should power be balanced between pan-London government and local 
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authorities within and beyond London's borders? Histories of water supply and other 
public utilities in London have demonstrated how struggles over their ownership and 
control were bound up with debates over citizenship by the end of the nineteenth century. 
But the city has remained the central focus.6 Recently a regional turn in urban history has 
begun to explore ways in which cities have been connected to their hinterlands, while 
geographers and environmental historians have brought flows of water, sewage and energy 
within and beyond the city more clearly into view.7 Drawing on this regional focus, this 
article explores the problems for urban governance generated by the tidal river ± of 
balancing sectional and public interests ± as well as the problems the city itself has created 
for other communities and interest groups sharing the river. 
This account of the shifting governance of the tidal river assesses to what extent its 
dominant functions have determined both its material condition and the range of players 
involved in decision-making. The changing forms of river governance over the past fifty 
years potentially bear out regulation theory's view of the state as enmeshed in the defence 
of dominant economic interests, its modes of regulation or governance forming, in Karen 
Bakker's words, a 'dynamic (yet relatively coherent) set of social and political institutions 
that sustains a particular "regime of [capital] accumulation"'.8 It will be argued that 
although the river's key economic functions have in various ways been accorded primacy 
and determined the range of actors, there have also been political constraints to this, 
relating to public confidence and legitimacy, while pressure from outside state institutions 
has expanded the range of concerns and political interests incorporated into state policy. 
Following an outline of the agencies responsible for the Thames in the early 1960s, the 
article examines three phases during a period of fundamental change, both in the 
management of the Thames and other UK rivers and in prevailing understandings of the 
value of rivers within a wider eco-system. The first phase, during the 1960s, was marked 
by the prioritization of the river's functions as a drain and trading port, by the wretched 
condition of the river, and by institutional rivalries and technocratic adjustments which 
significantly improved the river without altering underlying assumptions about what it was 
for or how it should be governed. A second phase, spanning the late 1960s to mid 1970s, 
saw metropolitan institutions seeking to expand into the lower estuary, but also resistance 
from local government and civil society groups downstream, strengthened by the rising 
currency of environmental concerns. GLC landfill plans for the Kent riverside are the 
focus for this phase. In the third phase ± broadly envisaged from 1973 to the present day ± 
the Thames and other UK rivers were 're-scaled' within new modes of governance and 
ownership, from the short-lived integrated water, sewerage and river-basin management 
under nationalization, to water privatization and 'multi-level governance' within a wider 
European regulatory framework. These developments will be considered in the light of 
their implications for understanding the long-term challenges of river governance. 
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II  Estuary Governance Agencies 
 
The tidal river within London is often is distinguished in popular terms from 'the estuary' 
below the city, but following geographic usage 'estuary' here refers to the whole tidal river. 
The estuary flows eastwards from Teddington Weir through the conurbation of London, 
through the 'reclaimed', industrialised riverside downstream ± interrupted by the remaining 
marshes and mudflats ± to the 'outer estuary' in the North Sea.9 Figure 1 shows the river 
and some of its governance boundaries from just above the tidal limit to the seaward limits 
of London's port.  
FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
Estuary institutions in 1960 remained much as they had been since the early 1900s. The 
Port of London Authority (PLA), established in 1909, was the dominant statutory authority 
on the tidal river, responsible for navigation, the docks, shipping channels, dredging, river 
works licensing, sea fisheries, river conservancy and pollution control for the tideway.10 
Conservancy operations were financed by port users' dues, supplemented by abstraction 
and discharge fees on the tidal river.11 Recovering from the war by 1960, it reached its 
peak tonnage of 61.3 million in 1964.12 Other agencies included the City of London 
Corporation's Port Sanitary Authority, and metropolitan government: the London County 
Council (LCC, established in 1889). The LCC was responsible, within a 'London excluded 
area', for London's 'main drainage' sewers and sewage treatment works at Beckton and 
Crossness ± exempted from PLA pollution powers ± and for land drainage and flood 
control. Flood defences were a crucial issue in 1960, following the 1953 east coast flood 
that had killed 350 people, but were still being debated when the LCC was replaced by the 
larger Greater London Council (GLC) in 1965. The Metropolitan Water Board (MWB) 
had managed Greater London's water supply since 1904, replacing earlier private 
companies.13 It abstracted water from the freshwater Thames and, increasingly, from 
groundwater in the Thames catchment (river basin). The Thames Conservancy managed 
water resources within the Thames catchment, and river conservancy and pollution control 
for the freshwater river. The Lea river and waterways, flowing south into the Thames in 
East London, were managed by the Lea Conservancy Catchment Board. Downstream from 
London, conservancy and water resources were in the hands of the Essex and Kent River 
Boards from 1948, re-designated as River Authorities in 1965.14 Their lack of authority 
over the tidal Thames as it flowed through their patch was a source of tension with the 
PLA.  
The fragmented Thames was, therefore, both a matter of different agencies managing 
different stretches of the river and Thames catchment, and of overlapping jurisdictions 
within the same areas. Both created rivalries and problems in establishing legitimate 
claims to authority. In its early years the LCC's Progressive Liberals had fought hard to 
establish a claim ± on behalf of the capital's citizens ± as the rightful managers of London's 
water supply, river conservancy and the port itself (Figure 2). The creation of the PLA and 
MWB was a rejection of LCC claims and of direct municipal ownership and control.15 As 
public corporations, they ZHUHUXQE\ODUJHERDUGVHPERG\LQJDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYHSULQFLSOH¶
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and answerable to a minister, an arrangement intended to balance (the right kind of) river 
interests with public accountability. A majority on the PLA was elected by port users, the 
rest being appointed by port-related organisations and key London authorities (with four 
LCC appointees). The MWB included representatives from the LCC and local authorities 
within and around London.16 River conservancy boards followed a similar pattern.  
FIGURE 2 near here 
These public corporations represented, as Bill Luckin has pointed out, the 'ubiquitous 
tension betweeQ«WHFKQLFDOFRPSHWHQFH«DQG«SXEOLFFRQWURO
LQWKHSURYLVLRQRI
PHWURSROLWDQSXEOLFVHUYLFHVEXWWKH\ZHUHQRW
³SUH-modern" organisations'.17 Although 
they were much criticized for inadequate mechanisms of accountability and scrutiny, the 
expansion of 'arms-length' or 'delegated' government was an important feature of service 
provision in the modern period. By 1938, a third of British ports were run on this basis.18  
Both the semi-representative PLA and the representative metropolitan government were 
hampered by an incomplete mandate for their activities on the estuary. The PLA had the 
advantage of designated governance borders at the intersection of the estuary and the 
North Sea (Figure 1),19 but was subject to criticism from groups unrepresented on its 
board. The LCC, and later GLC, had an electoral mandate within their boundaries (though 
always in tension with London boroughs), but their sewage discharges and refuse services 
carried them well beyond their borders. The need to secure legitimacy with a wider set of 
interests and with the public was a recurring challenge for both these river agencies. 
 
 
III     Zero Velocity in Estuary Governance: 1949-1969 
'Zero velocity occurs at that point in the water column where the 
seaward movement of freshwater is balanced by the landward 
movement of sea-water.'20 
 
The section explores the tensions created by the two dominant functions on the tideway at 
the start of this period ± port and sewerage ± and assesses the extent to which these 
determined the parameters of public policy and prevented wider access to decision-making 
processes. As the agencies responsible for these functions up to 1973, the voices of the 
PLA and metropolitan government (LCC and GLC) could be heard above all others on the 
river, with the port pre-eminent. As PLA Chairman Thomas Wiles put it in 1944 with a 
swipe at LCC post-war reconstruction plans: 'unless London is re-established in her pre-
war eminence as the centre of international trade all schemes for enhancing her beauty will 
remain disappointing dreams.' A later PLA chairman was similarly confident in 1959 
about the river's other function: µPeople sometimes say ... that this or that river is like an 
open drain. In my view, that is exactly what a river ought to be; but it should be a clean 
DQGKHDOWK\GUDLQ¶21 The port authority's responsibility for pollution control on the 
estuary linked these two functions up to the 1960s. 
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The post-war years were marked by tensions within and beyond Greater London over river 
conservancy at a time of severe river pollution. The period since 1935 had been the worst 
on record. Long stretches of river were without oxygen ± biologically dead ± during the 
summer months up to the mid 1960s. A PLA-commissioned study of 1957 found no 
evidence of fish since 1920 over the forty miles between Richmond and Tilbury, apart 
from eels which were capable of taking air from the surface.22 There were questions in 
3DUOLDPHQWFRPSODLQWVIURPWKHSXEOLFDERXWDµIRXOVPHOOLQJJDV¶K\GURJHQVXOSKLGH
and, as the PLA reported in 1950, 'numerous complaints from shipowners and other river 
«LQWHUHVWVUHJDUGLQJWKHREQR[LRXVFRQGLWLRQRIWKH7KDPHV«DQG«GDPDJH«FDXVHG
thereby.'23 The sources of pollution were myriad and hard to identify. Industrial effluent 
discharges were a significant source, both official (with consents) and unofficial. Heavy 
siltation and deep shipping channels created oxygenation problems, as did synthetic 
detergents now entering the Thames and other European rivers. Cooling water from power 
stations contributed to rising water temperatures.24 In 1954, WKH3/$¶V5iver Purification 
officer reported that the µDYHUDJHWHPSHUDWXUHRYHUWKHZKROHRIWKH5LYHU-XO\-
September) at High Water was 20.8o C or practically 70o F', which, he pointed out, put 'the 
Thames in the same category as the Amazon or Zambezi River'. There was also, as a PLA 
board member put it in 1948, 'of necessity, much sewage and injurious matter falling into 
the Thames from the immense amount of shipping carried upon its waters'.25 Above all, 
though, the problem was sewage from Greater London's expanding population. The 1961 
Pippard Report identified five sewage treatment works, in particular, including those of the 
LCC, with 50% of total sewage in the tideway attributed to Beckton's discharges into 
Barking Reach.26 This was a long-standing problem: the decline in this reach had been the 
subject of complaints in the 1870s and 1880s that central London's earlier 'Great Stink' had 
simply been moved downstream. The shipping of settled solids (sewage sludge) to the 
outer estuary from the 1890s had sought to address this, but increasingly overloaded 
sewerage systems along the Thames in the early twentieth century were returning 
inadequately treated wastewater to the river.27 This was not just a one-way flow. The 
'retention' of water and effluents within the estuary system meant that discharges on the 
ebb tide returned upstream; pollutants released downstream could travel upstream. 28 
The post-war rehabilitation of the Thames is often characterised as a common sense 
response to a problem that had gone too far. Leslie Wood, in his excellent 1982 survey of 
the scientific project, pointed out that things reached a crisis when efforts to improve the 
Beckton outfall for the Festival of Britain failed in the summer of 1951. He considered that 
the clean-up 'resulted from a unique combination of enthusiasm of responsible bodies and 
devoted scientific investigation'.29 It was not so straightforward. Those same responsible 
bodies had overseen the degradation of the river. Acceptable and unacceptable levels of 
pollution have less to do with absolute standards than with cultural norms,30 and the post-
war tideway raised damaging questions about the competence and legitimacy of the 
governing institutions. Problems on the tidal Thames were part of a wider context of policy 
stagnation in the water sector in the years before and after the war, of a lack of money and 
government restrictions on capital expenditure, the multitude of vested interests in 
discharges, sewerage and water resources, and the fragmentation of groups lobbying for 
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cleaner rivers.31 Within this unpromising landscape, however, the responsible agencies on 
the tidal Thames did spur each other into action. 
It was the PLA who initiated the process in 1947, pressing the Ministry of Health on LCC 
sewerage and other pollutants, and requesting an investigation into siltation, with concerns 
that this was exacerbated by pollutants in the Mud Reaches (see Figure 1). Dredging silt to 
maintain navigation was a major expense for the port. Government funding was needed for 
research; expenditure restrictions were blocking both sewerage improvements and the 
MWB's long-planned reservoirs. Adequate freshwater flows were crucial for navigation in 
the tideway, but also for dilution of effluents and water aeration.32 The Government 
responded by setting up the Thames Survey Committee (TSC, 1947-64) to examine 
siltation ± later becoming a detailed pollution investigation ± and in 1951 the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government (MHLG) established an enquiry into effluent discharges 
and different agencies' pollution role (Pippard Committee, 1951-61). In 1953, LCC 
sewerage improvements were authorized.33 Both the LCC and PLA were found wanting in 
the Pippard Report, though with their representatives on both committees criticism was 
muted. Identifying the LCC outlets as the main polluters, exemption from PLA oversight 
was also seen as a weakness.34 The PLA's role in seeking improvements was applauded, 
but they were recommended to apply more stringent water quality standards, to improve 
effluent monitoring and to take river conditions as well as discharges into account.35 PLA 
reliance on the LCC for some of their water sampling ZDVFULWLFL]HGLWZDVµXQGHVLUDEOHLQ
SULQFLSOH¶IRUWKHSROOXWLRQDXWKRULW\WRUHO\RQWKHSROOXWLQJDXWKRULW\7KH/&&
V
continuous records of the condition of river water since the 1890s were considered by the 
76&DVSUREDEO\WKHPRVWµGHWDLOHGDQGH[WHQVLYH¶RIµDQ\HVWXDU\LQWKHZRUOG¶As a 
PLA FRQVHUYDQF\RIILFHUKDGSRLQWHGRXWDIHZ\HDUVHDUOLHUµthe interests of the Port 
$XWKRULW\¶ ZHUHµQRWQHFHVVDULO\WKRVHRf the London County Council and the P.L.A. 
should have its own data if only for DPDWWHURISUHVWLJH¶.36 The PLA continued to use LCC 
(and later GLC) data but made important changes to their knowledge base, engaging the 
TSC chair as chemical engineer, commissioning surveys of estuary fish populations, and 
setting up the Clean Thames Consultation Panel in 1965.37 They took action in the light of 
the TSC's conclusion that their  dredgings dumped in the outer estuary were returning 
upstream to the 'mud reaches', terminating this operation and developing instead silt 
lagoons at Rainham Marshes and Cliffe Marshes in Kent.38 The clean-up was both a 
scientific endeavour and a necessary public relations exercise for central government and 
the metropolitan river authorities. 
Was this function-led governance then, with the estuary sacrificed to the twin gods of 
shipping and sewage? These functions had undoubtedly been prioritised by central 
government, but their relations with the PLA and LCC were complicated. Civil servants 
were privately critical of both institutions, and river conservancy reform in the light of the 
PLA's track record was a recurring subject within government departments. When during 
debates over new River Boards in the late 1940s, downstream authorities had called for 
independent jurisdiction over the lower river, the government had preserved the LCC 
'London excluded area', as well as PLA conservancy on account of its 'particular and 
special powers' on the tidal river, but a clause in the 1948 River Boards Act allowed for a 
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future separate river authority for London.39 These pressures may have encouraged the 
PLA's heightened conservancy activity at that time. In the wake of Pippard and the 
Proudman Committee on water resources (1962), there were again confidential discussions 
of the PLA's role. A 1962 MHLG memo, noting Kent and Essex River Boards' criticisms 
of the PLA, considered that it was 'not particularly good', but '[t]hey naturally concentrate 
RQWKHLUPDLQMRE«
$QXSSHUHVWXDU\ULYHUDXWKRULW\ZDVFRQVLGHUHGXQIHDsible and there 
was 'no mandate' to restrict the PLA's role. The Water Resources Act 1963 (creating 29 
River Authorities, with increased powers) again allowed for a future London river 
conservancy.40 The Government solution instead was to expand PLA conservancy powers 
in 1964 alongside concessions to other agencies. The new GLC gained control over six 
non-tidal tributaries. Lower river agencies were incorporated into formal estuary 
consultation for the first time, sitting on a new Pollution Control Committee that the PLA 
were obliged to establish.41 PLA competence was scrutinized again during the Labour 
Government's 1969 deliberations over ports nationalization, alongside discussions over the 
Thames Conservancy taking over the tidal river, but these ended with Labour's 1970 
electoral defeat.42 The estuary governance structure was eventually settled by the 1973 
Water Act (see Section V). 
From the 1940s to the late 1960s, debates over the tidal river show estuary governance 
pulled in different directions but essentially staying at a point of zero velocity. Pressure to 
improve the river came from metropolitan agencies, central government and from 
downstream river authorities. Amidst tensions between agencies, the government 
tentatively incorporated new interests within the governance process in 1964. Rivalries 
between the PLA and LCC (and later GLC) over technocratic status were a spur to action 
during these years. Sewerage investment, pioneering research into effluent impacts, and 
improvements in water quality monitoring left underlying assumptions about the river's 
functions unchanged, but resulted in a much cleaner and better understood river.  The PLA 
reported 73 species of fish in 1973.43  
While river governance structures remained in place, however, changes within the port 
sector and the PLA's governing board during this time suggest a shift in perceptions of 
legitimate governance away from the 'representative principle' towards expertise as the 
basis of good management. Lord Rochdale's ports inquiry (1961) recommended that public 
ports should be run by small managerial teams, leading to power struggles in the Thames 
and other ports.44 When in 1966 the PLA sought to reduce the number of representatives 
on its board (retaining one GLC member), it was strongly opposed by several of the 
represented organizations. At a public inquiry the PLA insisted that consultation was as 
good as statutory representation; the GLC claimed that its river responsibilities required a 
strong board role. The GLC was backed as the guardian of the recreational Thames by the 
London Tourist Board and River Thames Society (RTS, formed in 1962), who argued that 
port was being allowed to dominate the river.45 Labour's Transport Minister, Barbara 
Castle, was reported confidentially to consider the views of the RTS, Tourist Board and 
7KDPHV3DVVHQJHU7UDQVSRUW)HGHUDWLRQWRµFRQWDLQWKHOHDVWVXEVWDQFH¶RIDOOREMHFWLRQV
WKH3/$ZDVµHVVHQWLDOO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHRSHUDWLRQRIDJUHDWWUDGLQJSRUW¶7KHULYHUDV
a multi-functional amenity was still a long way off. Following a meeting with the PLA 
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FKDLUPDQLWZDVQRWHGWKDWµWKHPLQLVWHU«VHHPHGWRJRRXWRIKHUZD\WRXUJHWKH
DQDORJ\RID%RDUGLQWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU¶46 Before the water industry's managerial 
revolution of 1973,47 then, the late 1960s saw a shift towards managerialism on the 
Thames and other ports, and a new focus on expertise as the source of authority. This 
process was completed when the PLA board was successfully halved in 1975, with 
representatives replaced by ministerial appointment of 

SHUVRQV>ZKR@KDYHDZLGHH[SHULHQFHRIDQG«FDSDFLW\LQRQH
or more of the following: business management, financial matters, 
sea transport, inland transport, international commerce, the 
organisation of workers, riverside activities, environmental matters 
affecting the area of the port of London and navigation."'48 
Though, significantly, members of the disenfranchised organizations continued to sit on 
the board, this was by invitation. The space for 'environmental matters' was new. 
If access to decision-making on the tidal river was partially opening up during these years, 
it also contracted through a new managerialism. From the late 1960s, however, there was 
an important development outside the confines of institutional closed shops. New players 
emerged who were to expand the field of expertise and raise fundamental questions about 
what the estuary was for and who should decide its future. 
 
 
IV 'Wetlands are Not Wastelands': 1968-86 
 
The late 1960s saw attempts by metropolitan authorities to expand along the estuary, met 
by increasing resistance to London-based plans. This section examines the implications of 
one of these border conflicts, over GLC refuse and sewage disposal. The GLC was meant 
to be a regional solution to the London problem; part of a wider, brief rise of 'big local 
government' in the UK and other Western European cities.49 Five and a half times the size 
of the LCC, it was similarly responsible for main drainage, sewage treatment and sludge 
boats, trade effluent control on the river, land drainage and flood defence within the 
'London excluded area'. It had a new role in refuse disposal for Greater London,  taking 
over borough waste transfer and the barges used for conveying refuse to landfill sites 
downstream. It had strategic planning powers for Greater London, including the riverside, 
alongside the planning role of the 32 London boroughs. London had already outgrown its 
new boundaries by 1965,50 however, and the GLC encountered problems of territorial 
resistance and lack of democratic mandate whenever it strayed across its boundary.  
[Insert Figure 3 near here] 
The new GLC had to dispose of three million tons of refuse a year (Figure 3).51 
Metropolitan refuse had been barged to low-lying marshland in Essex and Kent since at 
least the late nineteenth century. While this trade had created opportunities downstream, 
with estuary communities sending bricks and hay back upstream, it had also created 
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grievances ± from residents living beside refuse pits to fishermen complaining about 
rubbish dumped straight into the river.52 Finding landfill sites was an ongoing challenge. 
By the 1960s, waste disposal authorities across South East England were competing for 
abandoned pits, quarries and 'reclaimable' marshland.53 /RQGRQ¶VVHZDJHVOXGJHWRRKDG
been shipped downriver and dumped in the outer estuary since early LCC days. By 1971, 
the GLC was depositing around five million gallons annually in Barrow Deep (see Figure 
1), but there were increasing concerns over its effects on the estuary.54 A scheme for 
piping sludge direct to the sea was abandoned as too vulnerable to changing international 
regulations: Oslo Convention (1972) restrictions on the dumping of waste at sea by 
shipping and aircraft suggested tighter regulation of marine sewage disposal in the future.55 
Aiming to address both refuse and sewerage, the GLC began in 1972 to pursue a scheme to 
buy 1,600 acres in Kent: Stoke Ooze on the Hoo Peninsula, on the north bank of the 
Medway. This was an area of saltmarsh and mudflats covered twice a day by the high tide, 
formerly reclaimed land that had been dug for clay then partially claimed back by the river 
(see Figure 1). Situated between Kingsnorth Power Station and the industrialised Isle of 
Grain, it was way beyond the GLC boundary (Figure 4). The initial plan was to use part of 
the site for re-processing sewage sludge into soil, while the landfill area could eventually 
be sold for commercial development. Early estimates suggested it could take 12 year's 
worth of river-ERUQHUHIXVHDQGDOORI/RQGRQ¶VVHZDJHVOXGJH1RWDEO\WKLVDPELWLRXV
scheme coincided with the GLC's fight to retain control of sewerage in the run-up to the 
1973 Water Act.56 In 1974, when the GLC had lost that battle to the new Thames Water 
Authority (see Section V), they focused on the refuse element of the scheme. 
[insert Fig 4 around here:] 
Following a leak to the press in 1973, there was strong local protest at becoming 
µ/RQGRQ¶VGXVWELQ¶There were complaints of a lack of consultation from parishes to the 
county council. Territorial politics played an important part. '[T]here is a strong fear of the 
GLC' as 'WKH³%LJ%URWKHU´¶D GLC official noted after meeting Medway Borough 
Councillors. The GLC had been viewed with suspicion by its neighbours from the start, 
Kent County Councillors condemning the proposed authority in 1961 as '"a gigantic, 
UHPRWH«PDFKLQHIDUUHPRYHGIURP«JHQXLQHORFDOJRYHUQPHQW
$QGLWZDVD
beacon for complaints about consultation in the wake of its unpopular 'motorway box' 
plans.57 There was a gap too between GLC confidence in its own expertise and electoral 
mandate, and the democratic ideals of ad hoc community and pressure groups.58 There 
were protests from local civil society groups, such as the Hoo Peninsula Action Group, 
Dickens Country Protection Society, and Medway River Users Association, who objected 
to 'the despoilation of one of the characteristics that make the Medway different from the 
London river'.59 After a local public meeting in 1973, GLC's Labour Public Services 
chairman informed colleagues that '[a]lmost everyone' he had 'met was speaking from self 
LQWHUHVW
LQFOXGLQJWKRVH
IORJJLQJWKHHQYLURQPHQWDOLVVXHWRGHDWK¶. He nevertheless 
considered the scheme politically unfeasible.60 
It was these oppositional civil society groups who were to shift the balance of power in the 
estuary. Protests over refuse tips were nothing new but opposition to Stoke Ooze became 
linked to a high-profile, wide-ranging revaluation of estuaries that went beyond concerns 
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over pollution. This challenged the view of GLC engineers that the estuary marshes were 
µGHVRODWH¶VSDFHWKDWFRXOGRQO\EHQHILWIURP
UHFODPDWLRQ
SURYLGLQJVSDFHIRULQGXVWU\
and reducing flood defence costs. The PLA had encountered similar conflicts of values 
over their plans for a sea and airport at Maplin Sands, Foulness (from 1968), which had set 
the pattern for subsequent protests.61 These conflicts were characterised by the presence of 
national and international conservation groups alongside local community campaigns. The 
rising influence of environmental concerns in the late 1960s and early 1970s saw the 
emergence of new organisations ± such as Friends of the Earth (1971) and also older 
organisations such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB, formed 1889) 
enjoying expanding membership and spheres of activity.62 The GLC plan was also 
opposed by the influential Thames Estuary Wildlife Conservation Group (TEWCG), 
launched in 1976 to oppose a range of estuary developments. The group was part of a new 
RSPB strategy on estuaries across the country, including the Dee and Severn. Stressing the 
importance of estuaries as wintering and breeding grounds for birds,  they brought together 
local ornithology, wildlife conservation and amenity groups, and the Nature Conservancy 
Council (NCC).63  
Such national and international wildlife organisations established alternative sources of 
expert knowledge beyond the statutory river agencies.64 Research on all sides was spurred 
on by development proposals.65 Ornithologists Jeffery Harrison and Peter Grant stated that 
when the Thames was raised at the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands in Iran in 1971, 'at 
last one saw the real value of all the wildfowOFRXQWV«RYHUWKH\HDUV
ZLWKWKH
Wildfowlers Association of Great Britain and Ireland making 'the most authoritative 
conservation case'. Ramsar itself was a milestone in the transnational re-invention of 
estuaries, with its message that 'wetlands are nRWZDVWHODQGV¶66 Identifying specific areas 
as valuable for wildlife based on measurable characteristics challenged official 
representations of the function of estuaries. Rooted in early twentieth-century agitation for 
national parks and coastal preservation, this approach had taken statutory form with the 
creation of Nature Conservancy (1949-65) and the NCC in 1973, responsible for 
designating Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). Such designations could be used as 
a 'warrant' by NGOs and others.67 Harrison and Grant's own publication, Thames 
Transformed (1976), was part of this process, characterising stretches of the Thames and 
Medway estuaries and highlighting their vulnerability to contradictory government 
policies.68 Like Maplin (abandoned in 1974), Stoke Ooze became mired in opposition and 
rising estimated costs, and was dropped in 1978 as too expensive.69  
The revaluation of the Thames estuary took place in a wider context of increasingly 
influential environmental pressure groups, and expanded public expectations for 
participation in planning debates.70 This was not about de-industrialization, a waning of 
'vested interests' or rise of 'non-material values' on the estuary.71 Estuarial industry and 
transport pressures had been intensifying. The PLA's turn to container shipping and 
mechanised cargo-handling at Tilbury, Essex, in the late 1960s led to further port 
expansion plans. Under increased scrutiny, however, its µ2SHUDWLRQ7UXPSHW¶ (1968) ± to 
µLPSURYH¶DQGVWUDLJKWHQµLUUHJXODULWLHV¶LQWhe estuary banks, creating three hundred square 
miles of new land and a trumpet-shaped estuary ± was quietly dropped.72 Learning from 
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Maplin opposition, the PLA began to expand its own knowledge base and incorporate 
ecological expertise. Though rejecting an NCC bid for PLA board representation in 1973, 
they commissioned a series of NCC studies during this period, including a survey of 
possible nature reserves. The Advisory Panel to their 'Steering Committee on Conservation 
DQG(FRORJ\¶, formed in 1974, included leading estuary wildlife campaigners and aimed to 
'support the development of areas important to wild life on the river in a way compatible 
with development for economic JURZWK¶73 
The GLC's own approach to environmental management changed radically with the 
victory of the 'new urban left' in 1981, influenced by the urban nature conservation 
movement. Their Ecology Unit (established in 1982) and collaborations with groups such 
as London Wildlife Trust (founded 1981) provided a channel for expert-led community 
engagement.74 This also informed changing GLC views of the lower estuary. While the 
Greater London Development Plan (GLDP, 1969) had made no reference to ecology or 
wildlife, its sections on the river were among those revised in 1984. Rainham and 
Wennington Marshes (just inside the eastern GLC border), where the GLDP had planned 
'increasing commercial and industrial uses', were re-designated as sites 'where there should 
be a presumption against development', though given the GLC's continuing commitment to 
landfill in Rainham further years in power might have uncovered more tensions.75 
[FIGURE 5 near here] 
At the same time, the upper estuary was being re-shaped by London's dock closures 
between 1968 and 1980, and the departure of international shipping from the capital. 
Intense political conflict over the future of the riverside during the 1970s and 1980s, 
involved trades unions, local action groups, the GLC, and the PLA, now seen as having 
turned its back on the 'working river'.76 The creation of the London Docklands 
Development Corporation (LDDC, 1981-98) by the 'New Right' Conservative 
Government, by-passing the planning powers of dockland boroughs, showed no appetite 
for compromise, and GLC abolition in 1986 has been rightly identified with the loss of 
metropolitan autonomy and a new democratic deficit on the Thames.77 
There was, then, no linear development towards widening public participation on the river 
between the 1960s and 1980s. Civil society groups gained an increasing ability to shape 
public views on acceptable policy for the lower estuary from the late 1960s; London saw 
strong community engagement in riverside debates and a brief flourishing of ecological 
politics, but this was followed by a narrowing of the political circle with the creation of the 
LDDC and GLC abolition. In the context of overall river management, moreover, it is also 
important to remember that by the 1980s all London-based institutions had already lost 
control of key functions: water resources, sewerage and river conservancy were being 
governed at a different scale. 
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V  Regionalization, Privatization and Multi-level Governance: 1974 ± 2014 
 
The Conservative 1973 Water Act created ten public Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) 
across England and Wales, replacing 1,580 local agencies. Thames Water Authority 
(TWA) took over the whole 5,000 square mile Thames catchment, with the estuary below 
TWA's boundary divided between Anglian Water Authority on the north shore and 
Southern Water Authority to the south (giving a statutory role for the first time to lower 
river agencies). The TWA absorbed the MWB, Thames Conservancy, GLC sewerage and 
PLA pollution control, alongside other bodies and powers.78 Fierce political opposition 
nationally to the plan to erase the long-standing connection between ratepayers and their 
elected municipal representatives in water and sewerage services resulted in a concession; 
the proposed RWA management teams being replaced by large boards with a majority of 
local authority representatives.79 A GLC bid to take over the whole Thames catchment in 
place of the TWA failed, though they retained land drainage and flood management 
(opening the Thames Barrier in 1984) and gained river recreation responsibilities.80 
The creation of regional authorities reflected a recognition of the limitations of urban 
governance for managing water cycles. The river basin had emerged by the late 1960s as 
the 'natural' scale at which to govern a river. In theory, river-basin management meant 
centralised, integrated planning for the whole catchment, with associated economies of 
scale. Over time, regionalisation allowed water resources to be abstracted more intensively 
for London and other cities, despite the fears of London's governors. But the shift from 
localized to centralised decision-making was slow and uneven: managing competing river 
functions, river and water users, wildlife groups, and territorial conflicts across the Thames 
region involved numerous local struggles.81  
Achieving the right scale for estuary governance, moreover, has proved a constantly 
moving target. With international efforts to regulate the marine disposal of sewage during 
the 1970s and 1980s, sewage ceased to be a domestic affair. By 1987, the UK was one of 
the last remaining states still discharging sewage sludge into the North Sea; TWA was 
contributing 80 per cent of all such North Sea discharges.82 International regulation was a 
crucial constraint on Conservative water privatization policy in the late 1980s. The RWA's 
ambiguous status as both '"poachers and gamekeepers"' (sewerage and pollution control 
authority), and the risks for potential investors of non-compliance with an expanding range 
of European water directives, have been identified as central to the decision to keep river 
authorities in the public sector while privatizing water and sewerage utilities, as well as to 
the government u-turn on marine sewage in 1990.83 Privatization was accompanied by a 
greatly expanded regulatory framework and new forms of 'delegated accountability', with 
the creation of the National Rivers Authority (Environment Agency from 1996) and 
Drinking Water Inspectorate, alongside an economic regulator, OFWAT.84 The Thames 
and other estuaries emerged in the 1990s into a new landscape of 'multi-level governance', 
containing regional private companies (including Thames Water Utilities Ltd), national 
regulators, and EU directives providing supra-national mechanisms for statutory and civil 
society organisations concerned with a range of public issues, from drinking water quality 
to estuary habitats.85   
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VI Conclusion: Whose River? 
 
+HUEHUW
VYLVLRQRI
RQH«ZLVHJUDQGPRWKHU
KDVQRWEHHQUHDOLVHGRQWKH7KDPHV,WV
multi-faceted character ± now encompassing a range of market-oriented 'eco-system 
services' ± has made it impossible to delegate to a single body. Diverse estuary interests 
remain, from riverside industry to waste disposal and sewerage authorities, alongside 
newer arrivals such as the 'Thames Gateway' strategy, EU protected sites and marine 
planning.86 
'Whose river?' remains an open question, but some patterns have emerged from this study 
of the changing governance of the estuary as a contested space. The prioritization of 
sewerage and the port on the tideway had significant impacts on the post-war river, both 
on its condition and its governance, with highly restricted access to decision-making on the 
river and limitations on its use. Under pressure, initially from outside statutory agencies, 
alternative ways of understanding the estuary and a more pluralist arena have emerged. 
The need for central government and river agencies to maintain public trust as effective 
agencies has led over time to various forms of accommodation with a diverse range of 
critics, including interest groups, riverside communities and the wider public. Alongside 
international regulation, this has been an important driver both in the changing material 
condition of the river and in expanding the range of players within decision-making 
processes.87 
This has not been a linear or universal process. In some areas, changes in political culture 
took place amidst continuing functional pressures, as with the lower estuary in the 1970s. 
In others, they have been bound up with changing functions on the river. In the early 
1990s, following upstream dock closures, the tidal river in London began to emerge as a 
de-industrialized space with opportunities for a wider range of amenity river uses than at 
any earlier stage, amidst continuing debate over its future as a working river.88 Riverside 
property development now represents the dominant economic force on London's river and 
an ongoing site of struggle. Nor have expanding views on the value of rivers been 
accompanied by widening formal mechanisms for democratic governance of the river in 
any straightforward way. In the case of water and sewerage, they have coincided with the 
move towards managerialism and privatization. But the emergence of multi-level 
environmental regulation, enshrining obligations for public and stakeholder engagement, 
has secured wider access to decision-making than earlier ratepayer democracies and semi-
representative modes of governance alone could offer.89 Privatization has required greater 
regulation in order to maintain public confidence as well as centralized control than the 
closed circles of public sector professionals under nationalisation,90 though there has 
always been a need to achieve a wider consensus than that implied by formal governance 
structures. Recent critiques of new forms of environmental governance as 'neoliberal 
conservation' or 'market environmentalism' have revealed much about the technocratic and 
market-oriented assumptions underlying the economic mechanisms and political structures 
of current UK environmental and water regulation. But characterizations of these 
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structures as 'post-political' underestimate past difficulties: both the difficulties of groups 
outside fragmented statutory agencies seeking to promote alternative views, and the 
inadequacies of those agencies' past management of competing river functions and their 
leaky externalities, including pollution and other forms of environmental degradation.91 
Even the most 'representative' political bodies in the past rarely favoured widening 
participation in river governance or prioritised the intrinsic qualities of nature over its 
instrumental values. The GLC's 1980s experiments with urban nature conservation were a 
notable exception. Recent approaches to river management are part of an ongoing political 
struggle between different actors and interests to determine the meanings and fate of the 
Thames. 
The estuary continues to generate interdependencies and power relations within and 
beyond London. Development pressures in the Thames and other UK estuaries have 
remained a fertile source of conflict, though some forms of compromise have emerged that 
would have been unthinkable in the 1960s. 'London Gateway' port, opened in 2013, 
occupies three square miles of the Essex coast. Overcoming early opposition, its 
environmental 'mitigation' package was eventually endorsed by both Natural England and 
the RSPB, now a major landowner and power broker on the Thames.92 The Thames 
Tideway Tunnel currently under construction by Thames Water, while prompted by EU 
Urban Waste Water Directive (1991) requirements, faced opposition from riverside 
residential communities within London objecting to plans for their neighbourhoods and 
from those advocating (unsuccessfully) 'sustainable urban drainage systems'.93 Promoting 
London's economy remains a key driver for development, as demonstrated by various 
current schemes for a 'London airport' in the outer estuary. These are opposed by 
numerous local action and environmental groups, but prominently backed by the current 
Mayor of London and Greater London Authority (GLA). Established in 2000, the GLA has 
brought a new 'London First' message to the estuary.94 
Estuary policy is made within a complex arena and the culture of stakeholder engagement 
that emerged in the 1990s obscures continuing unequal access to decision-making.95 
Economic growth remains the spine of UK government policy and a government-backed 
scheme remains difficult to withstand,96 but the presence today of numerous civil society 
organisations with high levels of expertise has changed the balance of power over the past 
five decades. Political activity at local, national and international levels continues to 
generate new ways of perceiving rivers and other eco-systems that challenge technocratic 
claims about how the river should be run and shift the terrain of acceptable policy.  
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